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The Justices and News Judgment: 
The Supreme Court as News Editor 
* Amy Gajda 
In 2011, in Snyder v. Phelps, the military funeral protest case 
involving the Westboro Baptist Church, the United States Supreme Court 
again warned that courts needed to protect speech broadly, lest judges 
become what the Court called "inadvertent censors." 1 In the opinion, the 
Court touched upon what might be appropriate news, though the case 
only tangentially involved journalism. In a paragraph that specifically 
mentioned newsworthiness, the Court reminded readers that a matter of 
public concern2 would be any matter that related to political, social, or 
other concerns of the community, regardless of its inappropriateness or 
controversial nature. 3 
The Snyder opinion is filled with related citations to the Court's 
earlier, famous First Amendment jurisprudence upholding media rights 
to report or publish, including a case that refused to hold a newspaper 
liable for publishing the name of a rape victim, 4 a case in which a 
magazine published a photo spread fictionalizing in part a family's terror 
at the hands of captors, 5 and a case in which minister Jerry Falwell was 
parodied in a particularly tasteless way by Hustler magazine. 6 
The Snyder case, therefore, was obviously not the first time the 
Justices had tried their hand at defining newsworthiness. They had been 
* Associate Professor of Law, Tulane University Law School. The author is grateful for 
those comments from participants at the BYU Law Review Symposium: The Press, the Public, and 
the U.S. Supreme Court, and also for excellent research assistance from Dominique Fasano, 
Elizabeth La Vance, Ian Gunn, Parmita Samanta, and student editors at the BYU Law Review. 
I. 131S.Ct.l207,1216(2011). 
2. Courts in non-news contexts have somewhat routinely distinguished between matters of 
public concern and matters that have some sort of expanded news value. See, e.g., Domina v. Van 
Pelt, 235 F.3d 1091, 1097 (8th Cir. 2000) (differentiating between a matter of heightened public 
interest and a matter of public concern in a government employee speech case). Journalists, 
especially those who specialize in feature stories, would certainly agree that news necessarily 
extends beyond news of public concern. 
3. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1216. 
4. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 ( 1975). 
5. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
6. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
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doing so for well more than a century, in fact, and long before those 
famous cited decisions, sometimes acting more directly as after-the-fact 
editors and sometimes mentioning news value in a dicta-like fashion. In 
this way, the Supreme Court has decades of experience acting as a kind 
of a super news editor. 
To better understand this role and why it matters, it is important to 
understand what non-judicial news editors do. Within any newsroom, 
news editors have tremendous power and responsibility. They ultimately 
decide what news and information is appropriate public fodder and what 
news and information, though true, is better left unwritten or unsaid. 7 A 
news editor, for example, might decide that certain truthful information 
is too private or too embarrassing or too harmful to be part of a news 
story, even if the information might be relevant to some readers. A 
politician's affair, for example, might be withheld if reporters or editors 
ultimately decide that it has little to do with the politician's political life. 8 
Given the journalistic ethics standard for public persons, such 
information about a private person would likely never be published by a 
mainstream news source because, in any journalist's estimation, there 
would be nothing newsworthy for the public in the revelation. 
And this is where the judicial system comes in. Should similarly 
private information be published about a public or private figure, and 
should the person sue for a privacy invasion, courts and juries are 
ultimately left to decide whether the public value of the news item should 
trump the person's right to privacy. The Restatement, for example, 
describes the balance this way: 
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of 
another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if 
the matter publicized is of a kind that 
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and 
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public. 9 
7. The author worked as a journalist for many years before and during law school and 
taught reporting and journalism ethics courses at the University of lllinois for several years before 
joining the Tulane faculty. 
8. Newsworthiness often depends upon the politician's public life. A politician who 
promotes himself as one with strong family values but is having an extramarital affair, or a politician 
who uses anti-gay rhetoric but has had homosexual relations, is far more likely to be the subject of 
an investigative report than one whose private life aligns with the politician's public face. 
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 6520 ( 1977). 
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A definition for news, then, becomes highly relevant in privacy 
causes of action, among others, because a fact finder deciding a privacy 
claim is called upon to act as a news editor in deciding whether such 
information was of a type appropriate for public dissemination-whether 
it was "of legitimate public concern" or not. Legitimate public concern is 
not based upon any public need to know, however. The Restatement 
offers a broad definition, suggesting that matters of legitimate public 
concern include accidents, rare diseases, preteen pregnancy, and multiple 
other matters of "more or less deplorable, popular appeal." 10 
I have suggested previously that lower courts have lately been more 
accepting of the publication of private-facts tort and related privacy-like 
causes of action. For example, multiple privacy and privacy-like cases 
have sprung from the NBC reality crime series To Catch a Predator, a 
television program in which journalists follow Internet vigilantes and 
police officers involved in stings to catch Internet child-sex predators. 11 
Though it has decided a number of cases involving news judgment 
and potential liability, the Supreme Court often makes it a point to 
suggest its decision is no broader than the matter before it. Because of 
this, it has never truly decided in a broad fashion where the line between 
two strong constitutional principles-the right to privacy and the right to 
press freedom-should be drawn. But, perhaps at least somewhat 
surprisingly, the Justices' definition of newsworthiness over the years 
has crystalized into one that is much more in line with the Restatement; 
the Justices have held or suggested in multiple cases that news, or the 
information the public deserves to know, should be broadly construed 
and should not be based solely upon the public's need for the 
information. 
This symposium Article, part of a larger book project on the prickly 
relationship today between media and the courts, 12 looks historically at 
an earlier Supreme Court's sense of news, those times from the start of 
the United States to New York Times v. Sullivan, a decided turning point 
for journalism, when the Court told us what information it believes is in 
the public interest in a news sense 13 and what information might best be 
10. See id. cmt. g. 
II. See, e.g., Conradt v. NBC, 536 F. Supp. 2d 380 (S.D. N.Y. 2008), as described in Part IV. 
12. THE FIRST AMENDMENT BUBBLE: LEGAL CONTROLS ON NEWS AND INFORMATION IN AN 
AGE OF OVER-EXPOSURE (under contract with Harvard University Press). 
13. Not all Supreme Court cases cited within this Article have news media defendants, but 
most do. The others are cases in which the Court seems to be guiding the definition for news and 
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kept under wraps. The early Court took a restrictive approach to press 
freedoms; over time, however, the Court's view has broadened, and 
today it decides many Press Clause cases in much the same way that a 
news editor makes publication decisions. The Article first looks at the 
period from the Court's beginning through the early 1900s, when Candia 
v. Pettingill was decided. It then more closely analyzes Candia, a softer 
tum for the Court in its jurisprudence involving news. Third, it explores 
the period from Gandia through New York Times v. Sullivan and the 
types of news stories the Justices found appropriate. It ends with the 
suggestion that today's lower courts, which are seemingly more willing 
to restrict truthful news stories in the name of privacy and other 
principles, should consider that at least a century of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence supports a broader definition of newsworthiness. 
I. THE EARLY COURT AND LiMITS ON APPROPRIATE NEWS 
Measuring the latitude given publication of truthful information by 
the early Supreme Court, one might call the early Justices harsh editors 
indeed. The early Court was certainly accepting of information we all 
would agree would be newsworthy today, including news and 
information regarding treaties, 14 publications focusing on science and the 
arts, 15 and word about some of the proceedings of Congress and other 
legislative bodies. 16 
But some information that most would consider newsworthy today 
was, in the early Court's editorial eye, inappropriate for public 
consumption. This restriction on the availability of information 
sometimes had a narrow focus-the protection of an individual from 
embarrassment, for example-but it also sometimes protected what the 
Court found to be the greater societal good of government processes. In 
other words, in a legal sense, individual protection and societal 
protection would often trump whatever public good might come from the 
appropriate public infonnation. albeit in a non·media case. 
14. See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 272 (1796) (explaining that the Constitution 
requires that treaties "should be published tor the intonnation of all"). 
15. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103, 105 (1879) (writing that those who publish 
books on science or the useful arts communicate "useful knowledge" and finding the remarks in 
another case "instructive" that scientific infonnation was not daily changing like news). 
16. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 671 (1892) (quoting Justice Story with approval: "The 
public mind is enlightened by an attentive examination of the public measures; patriotism. and 
intc6>Tity, and wisdom obtain their due reward ... not by vague conjecture, but by positive facts."). 
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publication of such otherwise newsworthy information. As the Court 
itself wrote in 1821, "the sole end and aim of all our institutions is the 
safety and happiness of the citizen." 17 Given that priority, there would 
seem to be little value in information about that citizen that the public 
may wish to know. 
One surprising, early example of such a protective editorial mindset 
addressed the publication of information regarding public officials; the 
Court's sense seemed to be to protect the politician and his privacy. As 
background, today, in marked contrast, the journalistic and 
jurisprudential standard is that public figures, especially politicians, are 
nearly always fair game. The modem Restatement suggests that: 
One who voluntarily places himself in the public eye, by engaging in 
public activities, or by assuming a prominent role in institutions or 
activities having general economic, cultural, social or similar public 
interest, or by submitting himself or his work for public judgment, 
cannot complain when he is given publicity that he has sought, even 
though it may be unfavorable to him. So far as his public appearances 
and activities themselves are concerned, such an individual has, 
properly speaking, no right of privacy, since these are no longer his 
private affairs. Thus an actor, a prize fighter or a public officer has no 
cause of action when his appearances or activities in that capacity are 
recorded, pictured or commented upon in the press. In such a case, 
however, the legitimate interest of the public in the individual may 
extend beyond those matters which are themselves made public, and to 
some reasonable extent may include information as to matters that 
would otherwise be private. 18 
Later, the Restatement authors explain more specifically that 
"[r]evelations that may properly be made concerning a murderer or the 
President of the United States would not be privileged if they were to be 
made concerning one who is merely injured in an automobile 
accident." 19 Even beyond treatment of politicians, however, the standard 
is one not of public need but of popular appeal, even if that popular 
appeal might be found deplorable by some. 20 
Given the modem standard, it is interesting to find language quite 
protective of politicians and other public figures in early Supreme Court 
17. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204,226 (1821). 
18. RloSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS~ 6520 cmt. e ( 1977). 
19. !d. cmt. h. 
20. See id cmt. g. 
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cases. The news coverage we might take for granted today was not 
always found appropriate, and a public official's feelings and 
embarrassment about a truthful publication trumped any public right to 
learn certain details of his life. 
Consider the early case of White v. Nicholls, 21 decided by the Court 
in 1845. There, the publication was a missive sent to multiple public 
officials, including the President, complaining about Robert White, a 
customs collector. 22 The authors asked that White be removed from 
office for what they considered antibusiness and antigovernment actions, 
including his support of a speech against the President and, later, his 
distribution of "bushels" of copies of a newspaper reporting upon that 
speech. 23 White sued at least one author for attempting to bring him into 
public "scandal." 24 
The Justices were surprisingly moved by White's situation, 
describing the matter before them in rhetorical fashion: "How far, under 
an alleged right to examine into the fitness and qualifications of men who 
are either in office or are applicants for office ... under the obligation of 
a supposed duty to arraign such men either at the bar of their immediate 
superiors or that of public opinion, their reputation, their acts, their 
motives or feelings may be assailed with impunity."25 Men in "common 
life," the Justices wrote, had protections for "their safety and their 
peace," including protections against the publication of even presumably 
truthful information that would harm them in their roles as "sympathetic 
and social creature[ s ]" and would cause others to shun them. 26 
The Justices reasoned that such legal protections should extend "still 
farther" to protect those in official governmental positions, equating a 
politician with a businessman and finding that both had an important 
reputation to protect. 27 For "the rights and happiness of individuals" and 
the "quiet and good order of society," the Justices held: 
That every publication, either by writing, printing, or pictures, which 
charges upon or imputes to any person that which renders him liable to 
punishment, or which is calculated to make him infamous, or odious. or 
21. 44 U.S. 266 (1845). 
22. !d. 
23. !d. at271. 
24. !d. at 274. 
25. !d. at 285. 
26. !d. 
27. !d. 
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ridiculous, is prima facie a libel, and implies malice in the author and 
publisher towards the person concerning whom such publication is 
made. 28 
Malice, the Justices decided, would be presumed to exist and need 
not be proved in most cases; whatever justification may have existed for 
the information would be the burden of the defendant. 29 
Consider the impact such a decision would have had on a journalist 
of the day. Truth would be little defense to a lawsuit brought against a 
publisher who made a public official look odious or ridiculous, even if 
the published information were true. Instead, the happiness of the 
politician and society's need for quiet and order trumped, at least in a 
presumptive way, the news value ofthe underlying information.30 
So protective was it, the Court even struggled a bit with whether 
"calumnious or inflammatory speeches" given on the legislative floor 
should be published. 31 Though presumably meant to protect the person at 
whom the calumnious or inflammatory speech was aimed (the Court 
suggested that some of the language spoken on the floor may bring 
personal suffering to others 32), the limitation on such reporting certainly 
also protects the publically elected speaker. Such protection, in the 
Court's words, enabled "representatives to execute the functions of their 
office without fear of prosecutions, civil or crimina1."33 
Thirty years after White v. Nicholls, a federal statute put before the 
Court negatively affected newspapers by making it a criminal act to put 
into the mail "any article ... designed or intended for the prevention of 
conception or procuring of abortion" and anything "giving information, 
directly or indirectly, where, or how, or of whom, or by what means, 
either of the things before mentioned may be obtained or made."34 The 
statute also restricted the publication of any information regarding a 
lottery. The early Court upheld these restrictions on publication over 
freedom of the press arguments, finding that congressional intent was to 
28. ld. at 291 (emphasis added). 
29. !d. 
30. I will argue in an upcoming article that this decision and others laid the groundwork for 
privacy long before Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis wrote The Right to Privacy in 1890. 
31. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168,202 (1880). 
32. !d. 
33. !d. at 203. 
34. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 736 (1877). The case, as earlier explained, is primarily 
one regarding a newspaper's right to publish information on a lottery. 
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keep such indelicate matters as contraception, abortion, and lotteries 
from the public mails as corruptive influences and injurious to public 
morals. The Court decided that any restraint on the press was minor 
when balanced against the potentially corruptive information. 35 
Also in the name of public good, the Court brushed aside the 
argument that journalists should be able to attend and cover public 
executions. In 1890, the Court decided Holden v. Minnesota 36 and held 
that an Indiana law excluding journalists from hangings was 
constitutionally valid. More relevant here, however, was the Court's 
response to a second part of the law that mandated limited newspaper 
coverage of such an execution, the statute read: "No account of the 
details of such execution, beyond the statement of the fact that such 
convict was on the day in question duly executed according to law, shall 
be published in any newspaper."37 Such a limitation, the Justices 
decided, was put in place by a wise legislature for the public good. 38 
It was also apparently for both the private and public good that 
sensational information about pending court cases be restricted. In 1904, 
the Court decided Dorr v. United States, 39 where the defendant-journalist 
had published what appears to have been a rather sensational account of 
a trial, including headlines in capital letters that read "TRAITOR, 
SEDUCER, AND PERJURER" and "WIFE WOULD HAVE KILLED 
HIM."40 In upholding sanctions against the journalist, the Court relied 
upon an earlier case in which a journalist was held liable for publishing a 
headline that embarrassed the plaintiff.41 The editorial reprimand, the 
Court found, was appropriate because, '"[t]he publisher must add 
nothing ofhis own"' to such trial reporting and '"all sensational headings 
to reports should be avoided. "'42 These sensational headlines, the 
Justices opined in upholding the punishment, were "unnecessary to a fair 
and truthful report of judicial proceedings."43 
35. !d. at 727. 
36. 137U.S.483(1890). 
37. !d. at 486. 
38. !d. at 491. 
39. 195 U.S. 138 (1904 ). 
40. !d. at 149. 
41. Hayes v. Press Co., 18 A. 331 (Pa. 1889). 
42. Dorr, 195 U.S. at 152-53 (quoting NEWELL ON DEFAMATION, LiREL AND SLANDER~ 
163). 
43. !d. at 153. 
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In Patterson v. Colorado, 44 decided three years later, the Court ruled 
against the publisher of news articles and an editorial cartoon designed to 
criticize the Colorado Supreme Court. The journalist argued that the 
articles were true and that press freedoms protected him, but the Court 
decided that such critical publications were necessarily "contrary to the 
public welfare," that punishment could extend to such truthful 
statements, and that such publications tended to obstruct the 
administration of justice. 45 The Justices admonished the newspaper for 
publishing the material, suggesting that editorial "propriety and 
necessity" should have caused them to decide to suppress it. 46 
There is an additional surprising aspect of importance in Patterson. 
In the decision, the Supreme Court quoted with approval an earlier 
Massachusetts Supreme Court case in which a newspaper publisher was 
held liable for publishing a truthful news story about a man who 
presumably died of alcohol poisoning at a local bar.47 The lower court 
had found the truth of the information to be of little relevance: "No state 
of society would be more deplorable," the court wrote, "than that which 
would admit an indiscriminate right in every citizen to arraign the 
conduct of every other, before the public, in newspapers ... not only for 
crimes, but for faults, foibles, deformities of mind or person, even 
admitting all such allegations to be true."48 Such "private intermeddlers" 
such as journalists, the court wrote, should not be given the power to 
disrupt "the circle of friends, families, children and domestics" that 
would occur should the defendant prove the truth of embarrassing 
information; 49 it turned away any argument that this particular 
information-a death in a bar, presumably from alcohol poisoning or bad 
alcohol-was newsworthy and both of public interest and public 
concern. 50 Instead, the court focused on the potential harm to the bar's 
owner, who would suffer business losses whether the information was 
true or false. 51 Ultimately, private embarrassment won out over the 
44. Patterson v. Colorado ex ref. Att'y Gen., 205 U.S. 454 ( 1907). 
45. /d.at462. 
46. !d. at 463. 
47. !d. at 462 (citing Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. 304 ( 1825)). 
48. Blanding, 20 Mass. at 312. 
49. !d. at 313. 
50. /d.at31R. 
5 1. !d. at 3 19-20. 
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public interest52 in a case involving a story most would find quite 
newsworthy today. 
A final quick example of the early divide in editorial choices 
between the early Justices and journalists comes from an 1887 case in 
which a party attempted to introduce newspaper articles to prove bad 
character. 53 Such crime-focused "sensational articles," the Court scoffed, 
were of little use because they were "of too indefinite and uncertain a 
character" to be of use. 54 
There were some glimmers of hope through this early period, 
however, that news would one day encompass more than just 
information that the Justices themselves found palatable. In 1878, for 
example, the Justices seemed to credit newspapers or, more precisely, the 
"newspaper enterprise" with "universal education" and bringing to "all 
the intelligent people" "every case of public interest"; those who would 
be the best jurors, the Court suggested, would likely have read or heard 
about any newsworthy court case. 55 In The Telephone Cases, the Court 
seemed to approve of newspapers as some evidence to prove historical 
fact. 56 In 1887, the Justices recognized public value in "intelligence of 
general and public interest," though they failed to define the phrase, and 
upheld an Indiana statute that allowed for such news to be transmitted by 
telegraph before an older queue of private messages. 57 And in 
Swearingen v. United States, decided in 1896, they wrote that while a 
newspaper editorial used language that was "exceedingly coarse and 
vulgar" and potentially libelous, it was not "obscene, lewd, and 
lascivious," was not calculated to corrupt mind and morals, and could 
therefore be mailed. 58 
A final hint that the Court was becoming a bit more understanding of 
the news process came in 1909. At issue in the case was a newspaper 
advertisement for whiskey that featured a photograph of a teetotaler used 
52. !d. at 320---21. 
53. Goetz v. Bank of Kansas City, 119 U.S. 551, 555 (1887). 
54. !d. 
55. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155-57 (1878). There are other, similar cases 
around this same time period essentially permitting the press to publish information on pending 
cases, even those that might influence a potential juror's opinion in the case. See, e.g., Spies v. 
Illinois, 123 U.S. 131 (1887). 
56. 126 U.S. I (1888). 
57. W. Union Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U.S. 347.358 (1887). 
58. Swearingen v. United States, 161 U.S. 446,450-51 (1896). 
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without her permission. 59 The Court found in the teetotaler's favor, but, 
in related dicta, seemed to be moving away from a concern for those 
featured in an emotionally harmful way in a news story. 60 "If a man sees 
fit to publish manifestly hurtful statements concerning an individual, 
without other justification than exists for ... a piece of news," the Court 
wrote, "the usual principles of tort will make him liable .... " 61 
But, in total, from its start through 1912, the Court had ruled against 
journalistic news judgment in sometimes very surprising ways. 
II. 1912 AND GREATER RECOGNITION FOR NEWS 
By 1912, the Court seemed willing to share its editorial expertise 
with those journalists before it and those nonparties who would be 
affected by its at least somewhat restrictive perception of what news was 
appropriate for the public to know. The Court had decided that for either 
the good of society or one of its citizens, newspapers could not publish 
articles regarding pending court cases that others might find critical of 
the courts; they could not publish articles on contraception, abortion, and 
lotteries; 62 they could not publish political cartoons that might embarrass 
courts; they could not use certain sensational headlines; they could not 
report on executions other than to simply state that they had happened; 
and, perhaps most importantly, they were limited in what they could 
publish about public officials because the leaders' individual happiness 
was paramount and such reporting might embarrass them. 
It is surprising, then, that in 1912, with that sort of history, the 
Justices decided Gandia v. Pettingill63 as they did. Gandia turned the 
tide slightly in favor of newspapers and their editorial decisions 
regarding public officials. 
The Gandia plaintiff, Mr. Pettingill, was a United States Attorney for 
Puerto Rico, and the newspaper in Puerto Rico published a critical news 
item suggesting that he follow the rules that applied to local public 
officials and not carry on a law practice outside of his official duties. 64 
The editorial basically argued that Pettingill, though acting lawfully, was 
59. Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 188 (1909). 
60. !d. at 189. 
61. !d. 
62. See generally ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 1878 (1877). 
63. 222 u.s. 452 (1912). 
64. !d. at 457. 
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acting unethically and argued that federal law should confonn with local 
law in prohibiting such a practice. 65 Pettingill's attorney described the 
facts this way: 
The . . . publication against plaintiff. . . was libelous per se. The 
language used showed a clear intent to injure plaintiff in his profession 
as a lawyer and to induce the public to believe that he was intentionally 
and continuously violating the law and guilty of unprofessional 
conduct. 66 
Admittedly, the article seems to have pushed the boundaries of 
mainstream reporting even by today's standards. As Justice Holmes 
wrote in a unanimous decision by the Court, "The conduct of Mr. 
Pettingill ... is described as a monstrous immorality, a scandal .... "67 
But, Justice Holmes also noted, the reporting was completely accurate: in 
his role as private practitioner, Mr. Pettingill had filed cases against the 
local government, even as he served as the U.S. Attorney, and it was true 
that the public found such a dual role distasteful because, had he been an 
attorney for the local government, a statute would have prevented him 
from continuing in both practices. 68 Considering that the underlying 
charge against the newspaper was libel, "there was no issue on the matter 
offact."69 
For the attorneys representing Pettingill, however, the fact that the 
article was truthful made little difference under the reasoning in the 
White case, decided nearly seventy years before. 70 Under White, the 
mere fact that the information was embarrassingly critical and harmed 
Pettingill in his line of work was all that mattered; whether the 
information was true was entirely irrelevant. 
But the Supreme Court shifted its stance and rejected the narrowness 
of the White ruling. 71 First, the Justices explained that Pettingill was the 
type of person the public should care about and reasoned that 
information regarding him was fairly reported, even if that information 
65. See generally Gandia v. Pettingill, 222 U.S. 452 (1912). 
66. !d. at 455. 
67. /d.at457. 
68. /d. 
69. !d. 
70. ld at 454. 
71. /d. at 457. 
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----------------------------------
might harm him in his line of work. 72 Pettingill was a "public officer in 
whose course of action connected with his office the citizens of Porto 
[sic] Rico had a serious interest, and anything bearing on such action 
was a legitimate subject of statement and comment."73 Accordingly, the 
Justices decided, the question was not whether the information published 
was harmful to Pettingill but whether the information that had been 
published was in some way unreasonable; that decision, the Court held, 
was taken away from the jury when the judge found such an article to be 
libel per se. 74 
Moreover, the Justices deferred a bit to the way the newspaper 
handled the story and described the newspaper's language more 
temperately despite its sensationalism, finding that the reporting--
described as a "somewhat more exuberant expression[] of meridiana! 
speech"75--seemed at least somewhat appropriate under the 
circumstances and certainly not libelous as a matter of law. 76 The Court 
continued: "But what really hurt the plaintiff was not the comment but 
the fact. The witnesses for the plaintiff said that the people of Porto [sic] 
Rico considered the acts charged immoral, and the statute referred to 
showed that such was their conception of public duty."77 
In other words, the newspaper had published something sensational 
but true on a matter of public interest involving a public official, and it 
seemed to the Justices that the newspaper should not be liable for such a 
publication even if it embarrassed the plaintiff. 78 Sure, the plaintiffs 
actions were technically lawful, and, sure, the newspaper criticized him 
and placed him under the microscope for these lawful acts, but he could 
not recover under those circumstances alone. 79 
The Court, however, did not end newspaper liability in similar cases. 
It suggested early in the decision that the newspaper defendant would not 
be liable for a truthful publication regarding something that was "a 
legitimate subject of statement and comment,"80 but it then also noted 
72. ld 
73. /d. (emphasis added). 
74. /d. at 457-58. 
75. !d. at 458. 
76. /d. 
77. /d. at 458-59. 
78. /d. 
79. /d. 
80. ld at 457. 
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that the outcome might be different in a case where a jury found express 
malice or excess. 81 This meant that, under Gandia, a newspaper's 
motive and the reasonableness of its comments would be scrutinized in 
future cases, 82 presumably even when the reporting involved true facts. 
In 1912, then, libel could exist in cases involving truthful publication if 
the publication pushed the envelope too far or if reporters acted out of 
some not-yet-satisfactorily-defined express malice. 83 
Even so, Gandia was a victory for newspapers, previously saddled 
with potential liability for publishing embarrassing yet truthful 
information regarding public officials. The Justices, it may have seemed 
to journalists at the time, were starting to understand the nature of 
journalism and were starting to recognize, as would a news editor, that 
some stories could do individual harm but were decidedly important in a 
public information sense. 
Ill. TOWARD A BROADER DEFINITION FOR NEWSWORTHINESS 
Gandia was not a clean break from past days of harsh editorial 
criticism from the Supreme Court. The Justices had suggested, after all, 
that courts should continue to look for malice and excess in truthful 
stories even regarding public officials. 84 The Court waffled for the next 
twenty years; it was deferential toward journalism's editorial decisions in 
some cases but critical and skeptical toward journalistic traditions in 
others. 85 
It may have been simply that those on the Court had grown more 
comfortable with the editorial decisions made by newspapers and 
newspersons. The Court's rhetoric seemed to indicate such a change. 
News, the Justices respectfully wrote in a 1918 copyright case, was 
"information respecting current events ... a report of matters [that are] 
ordinarily publici juris ... [and] the history of the day."86 News, they 
81. !d. The Justices explained that such a phrase needed further analysis that was 
inappropriate to the case before them. 
82. !d. 
83. !d. at 458. 
84. !d. at 457. 
85. In Lewis Publ'g Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913), publishers had argued that certain 
mailing restrictions impacted press freedoms, but the Court disagreed, explaining that Justices were 
"concerned not with any general regulation of what should be published in newspapers" but instead 
with the propriety of mailing privileges. !d. at 316. 
86. Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918). 
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noted, which was often based on public tips to journalists who then 
investigated the tip, 87 was "extremely useful"88 and had particular value 
when novel and fresh. 89 
During this period, the Court twice upheld a newspaper's right to 
publish certain information from tax returns, even though a federal law at 
the time prevented such a publication. 90 The Justices decided that such 
coverage, including "names and addresses of tax payers and the amounts 
paid by them"91 was-to quote the Court's editor-like language 
directly-"[a] proper matter for news publication"92 because the 
information had been made publically accessible and any law that 
criminalized publication under those circumstances would abridge press 
freedoms. 93 
But at the same time that the Justices seemed to be more accepting of 
the printed press, broadcast news suffered its first defeat. The case, 
Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 94 involved the 
censorship of newsreels. These newsreels were shorter films shown in 
theaters before a feature-length movie; they contained news of "events of 
historical and current interest" and are described in a way that makes 
them consistent with today's national newscasts. 95 Because any type of 
motion picture was so new at the time, the case syllabus helpfully 
explained that they were "a series of instantaneous photographs ... 
projected upon a screen with great rapidity [so that] there appears to the 
eye an illusion ofmotion."96 
The producers argued that newsreels should not have to go before a 
censoring board before a public showing. These films, they explained, 
were not merely entertainment, but had news value and, therefore, should 
87. /d. at 243. 
88. !d. at 235. 
89. !d. at 238. 
90. See United States v. Bait. Post, 268 U.S. 388 (1925); United States v. Dickey, 268 U.S. 
378 (1925). 
91. Dickey, 268 U.S. at 386. 
92. !d. at 384. 
93. !d. 
94. 236 U.S. 230 (1915). 
95. "A newsreel showing events from around the world, including Serbian troops returning 
from the front, the launch of the USS Mississippi, a unit of the Irish Rangers departing from 
Montreal, Canada, and the launching of the USS Shaw." Mutual Weekly, No. 109, IMDB, 
http://www.imdb.com/title/ttl799562 (last visited Sep. 12, 2012). 
96. Mutual Film Corp., 236 U.S. 230 at 232. 
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not be scrutinized by a government focused on morality97 the way in 
which a typical Hollywood feature film would be. The producers 
explained that newsreels were exactly like newspapers: they used 
"photographs [that were] promptly secured a few days after the events 
which they depict happen[ing]" and therefore "regularly furnish[ ed] and 
publish[ed] news," albeit "through the medium of motion pictures."98 
These newsreels, then, contained the sort of news the Supreme Court had 
recognized was at its best when novel and fresh. 99 Freedom of the press, 
the producers argued, was at issue. 
But a highly skeptical Court rejected the argument that news films 
deserved any special protection and that newsreels were any different 
from a Hollywood blockbuster. "They may be used for evil," the Justices 
wrote, and the fact that they would bring together women, men, and 
children for viewing "rna[ d]e them the more insidious in corruption by a 
pretense of worthy purpose." 100 The Court continued, "They take their 
attraction from the general interest, eager and wholesome it may be, in 
their subjects, but a prurient interest may be excited and appealed to. 
Besides, there are some things which should not have pictorial 
representation in public places and to all audiences." 101 
The Court apparently felt that it did not need to elaborate and did not 
make clear precisely which topics would not be appropriate for all public 
audiences and why general interest in politicians was worthy while 
general interest in certain newsreel subjects may not be. And while the 
Justices suggested that they agreed with plaintiffs' counsel that newsreels 
were "a means of making or announcing publicly something that 
otherwise might have remained private or unknown," 102 they also 
worried about a certain "spectacle" 103 about them that did not exist in the 
print medium. Moreover, these types of newsreel "motion pictures" were 
"a business pure and simple," the Justices explained (without any 
apparent worry that newspapers also made money), and, therefore, were 
"not to be regarded ... as part of the press of the country or as organs of 
97. !d. at 241. 
98. !d. at 232. 
99. !d. at 233. 
100. !d. at 242. 
10 l. !d. 
102. !d. at 243. 
103. !d. at 244. 
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public opinion." 104 Instead, these newsreels were "mere representations 
of events, of ideas and sentiments published and known, vivid, useful 
and entertaining no doubt, but ... capable of evil, having power for it, 
the greater because of their attractiveness and manner of exhibition." 105 
It was acceptable, then, that the censoring hand of the state have first 
crack at them before public exhibition. The news value in the material 
and its timeliness, the Court decided, were no excuses for circumventing 
the process. 
It's true that the printed press also did not escape the editorial hand 
of the Court during this period, but most cases involved newspapers' 
criticism of certain government processes. In Toledo Newspaper Co. v. 
United States, 106 the Court upheld a contempt conviction brought against 
journalists who had published editorials and cartoons regarding a matter 
pending before a court. The publications did not sound outlandish; 
Justices Holmes and Brandeis described the newspaper's works as 
mainstream and, in condemning the contempt convictions, suggested that 
at most, the language and drawings "no doubt contained innuendos not 
flattering to [the judge's] personality." 107 A majority of the Supreme 
Court, however, rejected the argument that the information was of public 
concern and found instead that the administration of justice trumped 
because protection was needed from criticism that could lead to its 
destruction. 108 The Justices would also later uphold the conviction of a 
newspaper editor whose editorials criticized the draft. 109 
But then, in 1931, came Near v. Minnesota, 110 perhaps the decided 
tipping point in favor of journalism's own editorial sensibilities. Near did 
not involve what we might consider to be a mainstream newspaper. The 
defendant, Saturday Press, was described by the dissent as containing 
"malicious, scandalous and defamatory articles concerning the principal 
public officers, leading newspapers of the city, many private persons, 
and the Jewish race." 111 The Minnesota Supreme Court earlier had 
criticized Saturday Press journalists as scandalmongers who "regularly 
104. !d. 
105. !d. 
106. 247 U.S. 402 (1918). 
I 07. !d. at 424. 
I 08. !d. at 421. 
109. Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919). 
II 0. Ncar v. Minnesota ex rd Olson, 283 U.S. 697 ( 1931). 
Ill. /d. at 724 (Butler. J ., dissenting). 
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and customarily engaged in a business of conducting a newspaper 
sending to the public malicious [and] scandalous" articles, 112 warning 
that, though decidedly a newspaper of popular appeal, 113 it was obvious 
that "indulgence in such publications would soon deprave the moral taste 
of society and render it miserable." 114 Among the targets of its 
sensationalism-the subjects of stories the Minnesota court critically 
noted were designed to drive up circulation 115-were "the mayor of 
Minneapolis, the chief of police of Minneapolis, the county attorney of 
Hennepin county, the Jewish race, and the members of the grand jury of 
Hennepin county." 116 Therefore, the Minnesota court had decided, the 
Saturday Press was of "no real service to society" 117 and a nuisance 
under a Minnesota statute that outlawed publication, sales, and 
possession of any "malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper." 118 
The United States Supreme Court, however, reversed the Minnesota 
court's decision in a way that recognized journalistic value in even 
sensational, scandalous information presented in a way that would 
increase newspaper sales: 
[T]he articles charged in substance that a Jewish gangster was in 
control of gambling, bootlegging and racketeering in Minneapolis, and 
that law enforcing officers and agencies were not energetically 
performing their duties. Most of the charges were directed against the 
Chief of Police; he was charged with gross neglect of duty, illicit 
relations with gangsters, and with participation in graft. The County 
Attorney was charged with knowing the existing conditions and with 
failure to take adequate measures to remedy them. The Mayor was 
accused of inefficiency and dereliction. One member of the grand jury 
was stated to be in sympathy with the gangsters. A special grand jury 
and a special prosecutor were demanded to deal with the situation in 
general, and, in particular, to investigate an attempt to assassinate one 
Guilford, one of the original defendants, who, it appears from the 
articles, was shot by gangsters after the first issue of the periodical had 
been published. There is no question but that the articles made serious 
accusations against the public officers named and others in connection 
112. State ex rei. Olson v. Guilford, 219 N.W. 770, 773 (Minn. 1928). 
113. !d. 
114. !d. 
115. !d. at 772. 
116. /d.at771. 
117. !d. at 773. 
118. !d. at 770. 
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with the prevalence of crimes and the failure to expose and punish 
them. 119 
"The importance of this [reporting]," the Court explained, quoting 
James Madison on press liberties, "consists, besides the advancement of 
truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal 
sentiments ... whereby oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated, 
into more honourable and just modes of conducting affairs." 120 The 
Justices worried that the Minnesota statute permitted an injunction after 
"mere proof of publication," and looked not at truth alone, but at whether 
the journalists published truth "with good motives and for justifiable 
ends." 121 The Saturday Press, the Justices decided, could continue its so-
called scandalmongering-and the statute at issue lost its bite. 
It is true that in reversing the Minnesota decision the Court focused 
more on the prior restraint aspects of the statute, but the Justices' 
reasoned description of the journalism at issue is marked; they could 
have joined with the Minnesota court in condemning the articles' 
sensationalism and focused on the way such editorial decisions seemed 
designed to increase circulation to the detriment of those persons at issue, 
but they did not. 
Instead, and keenly important here, the Justices wrote that public 
officials' character and conduct should remain open for free debate and 
discussion in journalism 122 and that a press that was both vigilant and 
courageous needed to be encouraged by courts. 123 Corruption and crime 
within government were two areas deserving of journalistic scrutiny, 124 
of course, but so was the character of the public official. 125 Moreover, 
the substance of the reporting was far more important than its scandalous 
or sensational nature. The Court noted that any public officer who had 
been falsely represented-not just truthfully but embarrassingly or 
scandalously or sensationally represented-could simply sue for 
defamation. 126 
119. Near v. Minnesota ex ref. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 704 (1931). 
120. !d. at 717 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
121. !d. at 709-10. 
122. !d. at 719. 
123. !d. at 720. 
124. !d. at 719-20. 
125. !d. at 718. 
126. /d.at718-19. 
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Suddenly, protection of the individual and his emotions at the cost of 
press freedoms, concern about preserving government processes at all 
costs, and hand-wringing about the way sensationalism and scandal 
reporting might influence the public mind stopped. Instead of protecting 
individuals or society at the cost of limiting news of public interest, the 
limitation on news suggested by the Near Court was far more narrow: 
"No one would question but that a government might prevent ... the 
publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location 
of troops," the Court wrote. 127 
The Court continued its deferential-to-journalism language over the 
course of the next few decades as it moved toward the watershed 
decision in New York Times v. Sullivan. 128 Just a few years after Near, in 
1936, the Court decided Grosjean v. American Press Co. 129 and praised 
an untrammeled press as "a vital source of infonnation," noting that 
journalists helped shed light on the public and business affairs of the 
nation and misgovernment 130 and served as great interpreters between 
the government and the people. 131 To allow the press to be fettered, the 
Court wrote, "is to fetter ourselves." 132 Four years later, in 1940, in 
Thornhill v. Alabama, it embraced as important news not just 
information about government and its officials, but also "all issues about 
which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of 
society to cope with the exigencies of their period." 133 News about a 
business-related dispute, for example, was important public information 
not because the public needed to know about the precise issue, but 
because the information about the specific matter that the newspaper 
provided might affect broader issues, including future persons, future 
businesses, and a future even more industrial society. 134 
In 1941, in Bridges v. California, 135 the Court embraced reporting 
on the judicial system and ended the practice of finding in contempt 
127. Id.at716. 
12g_ 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
129. 297 U.S. 233 ( 1936 ). 
130. /d. at 250. 
131. !d. 
132. !d. 
133. 310 U.S. 88, 102--03 (1940) (suggesting that a labor dispute was decidedly one of those 
matters as it involved health and wages that impacted society in a very broad fashion). 
134. Id.at103. 
135. 314 U.S. 252 (1941). 
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those journalists who wrote about pending court decisions. It again 
moved toward an expanded definition for news, one that included stories 
merely in the public interest, not solely stories of weighty, life-changing, 
all-would-agree importance: "It must be recognized that public interest is 
much more likely to be kindled by a controversial event of the day than 
by a generalization, however penetrating, of the historian or scientist." 136 
The Court suggested that only extremely serious and substantial evils of 
publication could be punished and that news of public interest that was 
simply annoying to some obviously did not qualify. 137 The Justices also 
embraced those arguments regarding news value that they had rejected in 
Mutual Films and recognized the need for some news to get out to the 
public quickly, when the audience was "most receptive." 138 The Justices 
suggested that although some information might not be in good taste and 
might embarrass some, it should nonetheless be embraced as a matter of 
public interest and, therefore, valid news. 139 
In I 946, Justices in Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 140 moved even 
further away from equating news with public need. There, the Postmaster 
General had limited the mailing privileges of Esquire magazine, citing a 
statute that limited distribution to "information of a public character, or 
devoted to literature, the sciences, arts, or some special industry, and 
having a legitimate list of subscribers." 141 The Postmaster General's own 
reading of Esquire found no information of public, literary, scientific, 
artistic, or industrial character but, instead, ample proof that it was 
"morally improper" and "not for the public welfare and public good." 142 
But the Supreme Court's reading of Esquire was more sympathetic, 
focusing again on the value in certain stories that were merely in the 
public interest, including information on "topics of current interest," 
"sports," "fashion," and articles by and about prominent men in various 
fields, 143 even though others, the Court noted, would find such news and 
136. !d. at 26R. 
137. !d. at262-63. 
138. !d. at 269. 
139. !d. at 270. 
140. 327 U.S. 146 (1946). 
141. !d. at 148 (quoting Classification Act of 1879, 39 U.S.C ~ 226 (1946) (current version at 
39 U.S.C. ~4354) (originally enacted as Acton Mar. 3 1879, ch. 180, §14, 20 Stat. 359)(corresponds 
to ch. 443,48 Stat. 928 (1934))). 
142. !d. at 149. 
143. !d. at 150. 
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information risque or racy or in poor taste. 144 The Justices suggested it 
would be impossible to create a satisfactory test based solely upon 
literary or educational values and mandated a broadening of the statutory 
language. 145 "What is good literature, what has educational value, what 
is refined public information, what is good art, varies with individuals as 
it does from one generation to another," the Court explained, 146 rejecting 
any public "norm" in news and information as foreign to the system. 147 
"What seems to one to be trash," the Court noted importantly, "may have 
for others fleeting or even enduring values." 148 
Other decisions followed in line that were implicitly supportive of 
news and information in the public interest and deferring to 
journalism' s-and presumably the public's own-sensibilities, including 
sketchy, one-sided, lousy, unfair, strong, intemperate, unfairly critical, 
tasteless, sensational, inflammatory journalism. 149 
Perhaps the best example during this time was Winters v. New 
York, 150 a case that echoes the reasoning in Near. There, too, a state 
statute made it unlawful to publish a newspaper or magazine that was a 
nuisance, one, the statute noted, that was "principally made up of 
criminal news, police reports, or accounts of criminal deeds, or pictures, 
or stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust or crime." 151 
The offending publication at issue in Winters was titled 
Headquarters Detective: True Cases from the Police Blotter. 152 A New 
144. !d. at 151. 
145. !d. at 154--55. 
146. !d. at 157 (emphasis added). 
147. !d. at 158. 
148. !d. 
149. See, e.g., Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 192 (1952) (upholding a murder conviction 
even though news coverage before trial included details revealed by the prosecutor of the 
defendant's confession, the prosecutor's opinion that the defendant was guilty, and descriptions of 
the defendant as a "fiend" and a "sex-mad killer"); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374-76 (1947) 
(concluding that sketchy, one-sided, lousy, unfair, strong, intemperate, unfairly critical, tasteless 
reporting cannot be punished and that news of a community rallying against a judge's decision was a 
matter of legitimate public interest); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 348--49 ( 1946) ("For such 
injuries, when the statements amount to defamation, a judge has such remedy in damages for libel as 
do other public servants."). But see Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963) (reversing a 
murder conviction because the spectacle of a television confession prejudiced the community); Irvin 
v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,725 (1961) (holding that defendant did not get a fair trial due to prejudicial 
news coverage, including news that fostered strong prejudice against him). 
150. 333 U.S. 507 (1948). 
151. !d. at 508. 
152. !d. at 508 n.J. 
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York court had earlier described the magazine as one that contained 
"stories [] embellished with pictures of fiendish and gruesome crimes, 
and besprinkled with lurid photographs of victims and perpetrators." 153 
That is an apt description: the June 1940 issue, the issue reviewed by the 
Supreme Court in its decision, 154 features on its cover the image of a 
woman, presumably a model, bound to a chair, her eyes filled with fear 
and her mouth slightly open, apparently with horror. 155 The words on the 
cover headline what is inside: "Trailing the Tourist Camp Killers!" and 
"Slave to a Love Cult." 156 The stories in the issue also include 
"Murderers Make Mistakes: The law's greatest aid is stupidity" and 
"Girls Reformatory: The straight and narrow way-to crime!" 157 
Multiple photos feature models reenacting crime scenes in quite 
sensational ways, and there are two photos of what appears to be the 
actual body of a dead woman published as a sort of solve-it-yourself 
puzzle, with the results of the police investigation on the following 
page. 158 These crime news magazines were decidedly sensational and 
clearly lacked the revelation of government-corruption that was the focus 
of the Saturday Press stories in Near. But the crime sagas published 
within Headquarters Detective were apparently truthful, and it was clear 
from the proliferation of such magazines that the public was interested. 
As it did in Near, the Court struck down the ordinance against such 
publications as unconstitutional, reversing the conviction of a 
Headquarters Detective bookseller. 159 "Though we can see nothing of 
any possible value to society in these magazines," the Court wrote, once 
again tipping in favor of public interest and journalistic judgment, "they 
are as much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of 
literature." 160 
Just a few years later and just a few years before the sweeping 
changes brought about by New York Times v. Sullivan, the Court decided 
153. People v. Winters, 48 N.Y.S.2d 230,231 (1944), qff'd, 63 N.E.2d 98 (N.Y. 1945), rev'd 
sub nom. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 ( 1948). 
154. !d. 
155. Copy on file with author. 
156. !d. 
157. !d. 
158. !d. 
159. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507,510 (1948). 
160. !d. 
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Roth v. United States. 161 Though the case's real focus was on obscenity, 
it wrote that "[t]he protection given speech and press was fashioned to 
assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political 
and social changes desired by the people." 162 The Court also moved far 
away from a stifling definition for published news and information it had 
embraced in early years, holding that "[a]ll ideas having even the 
slightest redeeming social importance-unorthodox ideas, controversial 
ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion-have the 
full protection of the guaranties [of the First Amendment]." 163 
From there, of course, came the Court's decision in New York Times 
v. Sullivan, in which the Court protected journalists from lawsuits 
brought by public officials when the publication had made an honest 
mistake of fact. 164 As regarding news judgment, the Court worried about 
a newspaper's self-censorship and suggested that newspapers might not 
survive a "pall of fear and timidity" brought about by repeated lawsuits 
by public officials who had argued they had been defamed in the 
press. 165 It lauded news media that published information about those 
running for public office and suggested that information about a 
politician's character was so important that, except under exceptional 
circumstances of purposeful or nearly purposeful misreporting, it would 
be protected even if the press got the information, even derogatory 
information, wrong. 166 The Court decidedly chose the protection of the 
press over the protection of public officials' character. 
A quick, nonexhaustive review of some of the decisions that 
followed shows the Court often embraced or at least accepted even more 
difficult editorial choices, refusing to punish journalists who published 
accurate information about a rape that included the name of the 
victim, 167 the true names of juvenile offenders, 168 and a radio 
broadcaster who published the embarrassing but true recording of a 
161. 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). 
162. !d 
163. !d. (emphasis added). Admittedly, the Court limited this expansive language a bit to 
exclude those ideas that threaten areas of more important interests, though earlier it had limited those 
areas markedly to extremely serious and substantial evils. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 262 
(1941). 
164. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964 ). 
165. !d. at 278. 
166. !d. at 279-82. 
167. Cox Broad. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
168. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979). 
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private cellular phone call on a matter of public interest. 169 While 
recognizing that media would sometimes push the envelope in a 
sensationally harmful and incorrect way, the Court nonetheless found 
that it still deserved protection. 170 In a prior restraint sense at least, the 
Court echoed Near and found that any limitation on news would 
necessarily spring from "the direct, immediate, and irreparable harm that 
would result [and] outweigh the public's interest in knowing, for 
example, the specific details of troop movements during wartime." 171 In 
a case involving the publication of a rape victim's name, the Court sided 
with the newspaper and suggested that if it were ever appropriate 
constitutionally to punish a newspaper for publishing truthful 
information that the newspaper had lawfully obtained, it would be only 
in a situation where a "state interest of the highest order" was at issue. 172 
One case that turned against journalism was Zachinni v. Scripps-Howard 
Broadcasting Co., 173 in which a human cannonball successfully argued 
that a newscast should not be able to show his full performance. 174 But 
the decision was largely based on intellectual property rights, 175 and the 
Court seemed to recognize that such an event had news value: that, 
indeed, everyday people would be interested in someone who blew 
himself out from a cannon. 176 This was news even though it was 
decidedly information that the public did not need to know. 
It can be argued then, perhaps beginning somewhat fuzzily with the 
Gandia decision in 1912, that over the last 1 00 years the modem 
Supreme Court has embraced a fuller definition for news and has been 
more accepting of journalistic news judgment. It has explicitly and 
repeatedly recognized that although certain news and information may be 
distasteful or harmful or lacking in more refined taste or be far from 
information the public needs, such news remains in the public interest. 
169. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
170. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
171. Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 605 ( 1976 ). 
172. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989). 
173. 433 U.S. 562 ( 1977). 
174. !d. at 578. 
175. /d.at574-75. 
176. !d. at 569 (concluding that if "respondent had merely reported that petitioner was 
performing at the fair and described or commented on his act, with or without showing his picture on 
television, we would have a very different case"). 
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Such a sense of news is much more in line with how a seasoned news 
editor might decide what stories to cover and what stories to publish. 
IV. WHAT TODAY'S COURTS MIGHT LEARN FROM 100 YEARS OF A 
BROADER NEWS SENSE AND MORE DEFERENTIAL NEWS JUDGMENT 
What I have tried to show here is that the Supreme Court has had a 
broader news sense for at least a century and, over the course of time, 
seems to have embraced a news definition that is very much in line with 
that of a seasoned journalist. The Court, at least at times, seems quite 
deferential. There were glimmers that this would come to be the standard 
even in the 1800s, when the Justices recognized value in not just news of 
great importance but "intelligence of general and public interest." 177 
It is all the more surprising, then, given this level of protection for 
news judgment and the embrace of a fuller definition for news by the 
Supreme Court, that some lower courts today seem increasingly willing 
to punish journalism for coverage of events that are at least arguably in 
the public interest. Such decisions often do not adequately consider the 
chilling effects on journalism and the constitutional issues at stake. 178 
One of the best examples is Conradt v. NBC, 179 decided by a New 
York federal district court. The decision is one that might appeal at a gut 
level to those who criticize sensational media treatment of arrestees. 
William Conradt, a state prosecutor who had previously run for a 
judgeship in Texas, was caught in an online child-sex sting by a vigilante 
group known as Perverted Justice and NBC journalists who covered the 
investigation. When police showed up to arrest Conradt at his home for 
chatting in a highly sexualized way and sending related photographs to 
someone he apparently believed to be a thirteen-year-old boy, Conradt 
killed himself. The trial court, hearing a case for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress brought by his sister on his behalf, condemned NBC 
for, among other things, not recognizing that its story might cause 
Conradt harm. It allowed the case to progress closer to trial over NBC's 
arguments that such information was of "manifest public concern." 180 In 
177. W. Union Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U.S. 347,358 (1887). 
178. Amy Gajda, Judging Journalism: The Turn Toward Privacy and Judicial Regulation of 
the Press, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1039 (2009); Amy Gajda, The Value of Detective Stories, 9 J. 
TELECOMM. HIGH TECH. L. 385 (2011 ). 
179. 536 F. Supp. 2d 380 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
180. Jd. at 396. 
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rejecting NBC's arguments, the court wrote that "a jury could take note 
of the fact that ... NBC failed to act 'ethically' and violated 'numerous 
journalistic standards"'; it went on to cite certain provisions of the 
Society of Professional Journalists Code of Ethics: 
Recognize that gathering and reporting information may cause harm or 
discomfort. 
Recognize that private people have a greater right to control 
information about themselves than do public officials and others who 
seek power, influence or attention. Only an overriding public need can 
justify intrusion into anyone's privacy. 
h d 'd d . I 'd . . 181 S ow goo taste. A v01 pan enng to un cunos1ty. 
The opinion, therefore, focused much more on the journalists' acts 
and news sense and whether, in the judge's opinion, they fit within the 
perimeters of good taste springing from a nonbinding journalism ethics 
code-and not at all on the fact that Conradt was a public official, one 
who had run for public office, and one whose job it was to defend the 
public and prosecute those who attempted to harm children, precisely 
what he was being arrested for. As the Near Court wrote more than 
seventy years ago, public officers' "character and conduct remain open 
to debate and free discussion in the press," and individual harm should 
be of concern only in situations involving defamatory falsehoods, 182 not 
emotionally harming truths. Moreover, good taste under Supreme Court 
precedent upholding the lurid Headquarters Magazine cannot be a news 
standard. Certainly, journalism would be stifled if journalists were forced 
to consider the potential liability for a failure to align with a judge's 
preferred reading list and emotional distress should they reveal a public 
official's misconduct. 
A second example involved more frivolous matters, specifically a 
gossip item in a Washington, D.C., newspaper. There, the federal trial 
court decided an early motion in a defamation and privacy lawsuit 
against the newspaper that had reported that a producer for CNN had 
dated a number of men, including the coach for the University of 
Maryland men's basketball team. The producer sued for defamation 
because of the incorrect information in the article and its tone, but she 
also sued for invasion of privacy based upon the revelation that she had 
181. /d. at 397. 
182. Near v. Minnesota ex rei. Olson, 283 U.S. 697,719 (1931). 
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dated three men whom she had, in fact, dated. The article was decidedly 
gossipy and critical of the woman's purported actions: 
CNN Producer Kathy Benz, 35, uses her position to meet all the "right" 
people. She's been linked romantically with power players-including 
venture capitalist Jonathan Ledecky (a Washington Nationals 
ownership hopeful), University of Maryland basketball coach Gary 
Williams, Chicago Cubs VP John McDonough, Sirius CEO Mel 
Karmazin, actor Hugh O'Brien, CNN correspondent John Bisney, 
Georgetown hairstylist Paul Bosserman and her one time fiance, AOL 
millionaire John Daggitt. Now she has hooked up, according to her gal 
pals, with porn king Mark Kulkis. The couple first met when Kulkis, 
40, president and CEO of Kick Ass Pictures, did a CNN interview 
while he was in D.C. for the National Republican Congressional 
Committee's annual President's Dinner. He's the honorary chairman of 
the NRCC's Business Advisory Council. That's a roundtable of 
millionaire entrepreneurs. Kulkis made tabloid headlines when he 
escorted porn star Mary Carey to GOP dinner with President Bush in 
June. At that time, he and Carey enjoyed a private lunch with White 
House insider Karl Rove. Wouldn't you have liked to have been a fly 
on that wall? 183 
Later, the newspaper ran a correction that read, in part: 
Ms. Benz says that she dated Gary Williams, Paul Bosserman and John 
Daggitt, but did not date the other men mentioned in the column. We 
regret the errors. We did not intend to suggest any improper 
relationship or misuse of her position at CNN and apologize to Ms. 
Benz for any offense taken. 184 
Benz's privacy claim was based on the publication of private facts 
for the parts of the story that were correct, arguing that her dating life, 
though presumably taking place at least in part in public, was private 
information. 185 The court readily agreed that such information was not 
fit for public consumption: 
The Court is persuaded that it is unlikely that an unmarried, 
professional woman in her 30s would want her private life about whom 
she had dated and had sexual relations revealed in the gossip column of 
183. Benz v. Wash. Newspaper Publ'g Co., No. 05-1760,2006 U.S. Dist. LEX IS 71827, at *5 
n.4 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2006). 
184. !d. at n.5. 
185. !d. at *22-23. 
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a widely distributed newspaper, particularly in the context in which the 
information was revealed. Further, plaintiffs personal, romantic life is 
not a matter of public concern. 186 
Here, too, the court gave no regard to the public interest in gossip 
items and certainly failed to differentiate between a quasi-public figure 
like CNN producer Benz (perhaps an involuntary one once she 
apparently dated certain high-profile men) and a thirty-something 
Hollywood star who similarly would not want her dating life revealed in 
the lines of a gossip column. Here, at least one journalist had decided 
that the public would, in fact, be interested in such a story and certainly 
People magazine and the gossip columns of daily newspapers thrive on 
similar tidbits. But instead of focusing on news-even gossipy news-
and the public interest, the court's focus was on what the subject of the 
story would want revealed about herself, something the Supreme Court 
had rejected as a standard nearly 100 years before. 
There are more recent examples oflower courts valuing and defining 
news in a more restrictive way. A federal district court in a 2012 privacy 
case involving the revelation of a crime of child molestation (but not 
involving traditional news media) wrote with certainty that "due to the 
passage of time, the public has no interest in the facts [of the child 
molestation crime] and will not benefit from them." 187 The court felt so 
strongly that no reasonable jury could decide the matter any differently 
that it granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and 
scheduled trial on a damages issues alone. 188 What is remarkable is that 
the court did not hesitate at all regarding its judgment of the news value 
of the underlying story. One can imagine a situation in which a crime, 
even a crime as devastating as child molestation, might, in fact, be of 
public interest. 
Another federal court more recently ruled that photographs of a 
celebrity wedding should not have been published in a gossip 
magazine. 189 As the court explained: 
186. !d. at *25. 
1g7. Pelc v. Nowak, No. 8-11-CV-79-T-17TGW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91125, at *6-7 
(M.D. Fla. July 2, 20 12). 
188. /d. at *6. 
189. Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., No. 10-56710,2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 16947 (9th Cir. 
Feb. 6, 20 12). 
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[Noelia Lorenzo] Monge and [Jorge] Reynoso were married at the 
"Little White Wedding Chapel" in Las Vegas, Nevada on January 3, 
2007. Valuing their privacy, and Monge's image as a young, single pop 
singer, the couple went to great lengths to keep the wedding a secret: 
only the minister and two chapel employees witnessed the ceremony. 
Using Monge's camera, chapel employees took three photos of the 
wedding; later that night at least three more photos of Monge and 
Reynoso in their nuptial garb were also taken. The pictures were 
intended for the couple's private use. For two years Monge and 
Reynoso succeeded in keeping their wedding a secret, even from their 
families. 190 
When a family friend and paparazzo found the photographs and sold 
them, the couple's attempts to keep the wedding a secret failed. The 
court explained, "Intent on secrecy, Reynoso denied the marriage to his 
own mother, but to no avail: She had already seen the wedding photos in 
a gossip magazine." 191 Despite a defense argument that copyright law 
creates a fair use exemption for newsworthy items, 192 suggesting that, at 
the very least, the "publication transformed the photos from their original 
purpose-images of a wedding night-into newsworthy evidence of a 
clandestine marriage," 193 the court held the magazine liable for 
publishing the photos. It advised, editorially, that journalists should have 
instead published the couple's marriage certificate, and it blamed the 
magazine for taking the right of control over the photos (and presumably 
the right of control over their personal lives) out of the hands of the 
celebrities. 194 
The dissent strongly warned that such a holding would lead to 
greater celebrity control over their images, even when the matter was one 
decidedly in the public interest, a wedding kept secret for two years in 
order to mislead the public. 195 The dissent worried-correctly, I think-
that the holding would, in fact, have a major impact on journalism: 
If public, newsworthy figures were permitted to invoke a "private use" 
exception, Tiger Woods, for example, could have claimed copyright in 
his sexting messages and, without fair use, the media would have no 
190. /d.at*3. 
191. !d. at *4. 
192. !d. at *15. 
193. !d. at *21. 
194. !d. at *31. 
195. !d. at *49 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
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right to quote them. Likewise, without a fair use defense, the media 
would have only been able to describe former Congressman Anthony 
Weiner's self-portraits, rather than reprint the images themselves. 196 
The holding, the dissent warned, would "effectively vest in the 
courts the power to circumscribe news stories and the sources upon 
which the media may rely." 197 
Each of these more recent examples has the potential to seriously 
impact future news decisions by journalists. The cases would make them 
question, at least, the propriety of coverage of past crimes, the 
publication of unreleased celebrity photos, and news stories about an 
arrest for a despicable crime like attempted child sex abuse. 
Most remarkably, such a narrowing of news seems contrary to the 
Supreme Court's century-long broadening of news. It goes against 
language from the Court in the Snyder case that warned of "inadvertent 
censorship" and that reminded readers that appropriate news coverage 
broadly included inappropriate or controversial news regarding political, 
social, or other concerns of the community. Through proscribing such 
coverage, lower courts seem to be moving back in time, defining news as 
did a very early Supreme Court, growing ever more focused on 
individual harm done to those who are the focus of news stories rather 
than on the public interest in the underlying story itself. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For at least a century, the United States Supreme Court has, more 
often than not, decided cases in line with journalistic sensibilities or, at 
least in a way that favors journalism. In doing so, even in cases involving 
extremely sympathetic plaintiffs, the Justices have moved away from the 
more restrictive language in earlier decisions in which the Court worried 
more about the protection of public persons than about the public's 
interest in the underlying information. 
Even though the Justices have never squarely decided precisely 
where the public interest ends and individual privacy begins and even 
though their decisions regarding news judgment are purposefully narrow, 
the cases cited in this Article help show that the line is closer to news 
that is of general, broad public interest rather than that of specific public 
196. !d. at *59. 
197. !d. at *60-61. 
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need. As much as lower courts seem to be starting to trend against news 
media in cases where they might disagree as to the propriety of coverage, 
this Supreme Court jurisprudence helps provide support for the argument 
that the First Amendment is more protective of news media than these 
courts allow. As the Court wrote in 1974, "the choice of material to go 
into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and 
content ofthe paper, and treatment of public issues and public officials-
whether fair or unfair--constitute the exercise of editorial control and 
judgment," suggesting that government regulation of "this crucial 
process" would not be constitutional under current First Amendment 
doctrine. 198 
198. Miami Herald Publ'g Co., v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974). 
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